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Abstract
To work as an accountability mechanism, fiscal decentralization requires the democratic
mechanism to function well. This is generally not the case where the quality of the
institutional environment is weak, and local governments might be captured by local
oligarchs. We explore this issue by studying how Italian municipalities reacted to an
unexpected tax reform reducing tax autonomy at the local level. Focusing on three Southern
provinces, where some municipal governments are captured by Camorra clans, our estimates
suggest that captured municipalities are less responsive to incentives stemming from re-
centralization. We also observe a different recomposition of spending between the two
groups, which we interpret – according to our theoretical model – considering the different
degrees with which clans can extract rents from public expenditure.
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1. Introduction
In line with the suggestions coming from a large literature, and for reasons contingent on current
historical circumstances, fiscal decentralization has become in recent decades a seemingly non-
controversial formula to improve resource allocation at the local level, a prescription inspiring
many reforms affecting the architecture of political power in both developing and developed
countries (e.g., World Bank, 2000). According to modern fiscal federalism literature, the main
argument sustaining decentralization has to be find in the right incentives to control potential
opportunistic behaviour of local politicians, when voters cannot observe their effort in managing
public resources (e.g., Qian and Weingast, 1997; Oates, 2005; Weingast, 2009; Albornoz and
Cabrales, 2013). The alignment of spending and funding responsibilities increases electoral
accountability of local politicians, providing effective incentives to discipline their behaviour.
Despite both the rigorous theoretical foundations and the support received from recent
empirical analyses – which emphasise the importance of the degree of fiscal decentralization
in explaining an effective impact on accountability (e.g., Jin and Zou, 2002; Borge and Rattsø,
2008; Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013; Boetti et al., 2012, Liberati and Sacchi, 2013, and Francese
et al., 2014, for the Italian case) – the above argument is unsatisfactory in explaining the real
outcomes of many decentralization initiatives, especially when these take place in developing
countries (e.g., Bardhan, 2002), or in the poorer areas of developed nations. The crucial issue
– advanced by a recent strand of literature (e.g., Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006a,b) – is the
quality of institutions at the local level, which has been implicitly assumed to be similar across
local contexts, while we generally observe large differences. In broad terms, institutions are
defined by the social norms allowing the working of democracy, and the connected mechanisms
of political accountability: in the presence of “weak” institutions, corruption of local officials
might become the norm, and the greater accountability deriving from fiscal decentralization
might be actually offset by the capture of policy-makers by local interest groups. In this case,
the potential advantages of having local governments more accountable towards citizens may be
displaced by the former being more prone to the desiderata of local oligarchs.
Despite the capture of local governments is a crucial element in order to understand the actual
effects of fiscal decentralization, there has been little work on the subject. Traditionally, scholars
have focused their attention on whether decentralization might curb corruption, without however
providing definitive answers, especially in terms of causality (e.g., Treisman, 2000; Fisman and
Gatti, 2002; Cooter, 2003; Fan et al., 2009). Whether the incentives stemming from fiscal
decentralization are always effective in influencing the behaviour of local governments, or they
are indeed contingent on the quality of local institutions – which then determines de facto also
the degree of corruption – is a question largely neglected so far in the literature.
In this paper we contribute at improving our understanding of this issue by looking at
contexts characterized by the presence of a particular type of strong local oligarchs, which have
been proved able to capture local officials and to interfere with the working of the democratic
mechanisms using violence (e.g., Alesina et al., 2016; Daniele and Dipoppa, 2017). In particular,
we consider the municipalities belonging to three provinces in Southern Italy – Naples, Caserta
and Salerno – where the Camorra clans (the local mafia-type organizations) are remarkably
active as vividly told in Saviano’s world-known Gomorrah (Saviano, 2008). We study whether
the incentives provided by fiscal decentralization are really effective also in the presence of such
elites at the municipal level, by exploiting a quasi-natural experiment involving municipalities:
the unforeseen exemption of the main residence from the local property tax (the so-called Imposta
Comunale sugli Immobili) implemented by the Central government in 2008 as a way to sustain
household consumption depressed by the severe economic crisis hitting also the Italian economy.
According to modern fiscal federalism theories, by reducing the degree of fiscal decentralization,
2
such a policy should have implied lower incentives to control opportunistic behaviour. In order
to test whether this conclusion holds true conditional on the quality of local institutions, we
need to identify municipalities characterized by “weak” institutional environments. To do so,
we take advantage of the Law 221/1991, which established that the municipal council can be
dismissed whenever there are reasons to believe that Mafia-type organizations have captured
local officials, as they are able to influence (or control) a relevant part of council members, with
sensible effects either on the functioning of the council itself or on the decisions it takes. This
allows us to separate municipal governments not captured by mafia-type organizations, which
are potentially accountable toward the citizens (the “strong” institutional environments), from
those captured by mafia-type organizations, which are expected to be unaffected by the policy
change (the “weak” institutional environments).
Using a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model, we provide evidence supporting the view that
the quality of local institutions does matter in determining the outcome of fiscal decentralization,
since the incentives stemming from decentralization are ineffective where institutions are weak. In
particular, according to theory, we show that in strong institutional environments the reduction
in tax autonomy causes a large increase in municipal spending with respect to municipalities
run by Camorra clans. As the latter are less sensitive to the change in the incentives provided
by tax autonomy, they appear to be more “fiscally responsible”. However, we also show that
the increase in spending is the result of a recomposition across spending categories. With
respect to municipalities infiltrated by mafia-clans, municipalities characterized by “strong”
institutions react by increasing social spending as well as a residual spending category, and
contemporaneously reducing spending for waste management. Our interpretation – stemming
from a simple theoretical model which we present in Section 2 – is that municipalities are
involved in the provision of many different local services, some of which might be more prone
than others to produce rents for local oligarchs. These results are robust to a less sharp
definition of Mafia-controlled municipalities, based on the idea that Camorra infiltrations can
affect also municipalities close to those whose council has been dismissed, as well as to alternative
specifications of the empirical model in an event study framework.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to a simple
theoretical model framing our research question. Institutional details on some key features of the
Italian local governments as well as of the tax reform are illustrated in Section 3. The empirical
model, the data and the results are presented in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical framework
In this Section we provide a theoretical framework to guide our empirical analysis below.
Hence, we consider a municipality made up by identical individuals with (consistent, convex and
continuous) preferences represented by the quasi concave utility function u(.) : (c, q, g) → <+,
defined over private consumption c and two different types of (local) public services, q and g.
Individuals’ private consumption, c, depends on exogenous income y as well as on the (local) tax
rate, t. We assume that, due to the lack of first best tax instruments, the local tax imposes a
dead-weight loss on consumers that is increasing and convex in the tax rate. Therefore, for the
representative individual c = (1− t− pit22 )y , where pi ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring the efficiency
loss from taxation. The local government faces the following budget constraint:
T + ty = q + g
where T denotes transfers from the central government to finance local spending. Notice that
T , q and g are all expressed in per-capita terms. Clearly, fiscal autonomy increases (decreases)
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when T decreases (increases) for a given level of spending.
To consider the quality of institutions, we assume local governments are of two possible kinds:
those whose decisions are driven by a mafia-type organization (what we term mafia-type local
governments); those whose decisions are not hetero-directed by organized crime (what we term
accountable governments). Both types of government wish to maximize rents. But, as local
politicians aim, for instance, at being re-elected, they need to keep consensus above a given level;
hence, rents maximization is constrained by the need to provide a minimum level of welfare to
the representative citizen. Mafia-type local governments have however the advantage of being
able to enforce citizens’ consensus by different means than by just providing services in exchange
of taxes: they can indeed use intimidation and violence. The reservation utility that this type
of government needs to grant to citizens is thus lower. This is captured here by a lower weight
being imposed on the utility of a representative citizen in communities where the government is
controlled by a mafia-type organization. Let λ = (λm, λn) be the weights imposed on citizens’
welfare by the mafia-type and the accountable government respectively, with 1 ≥ λn > λm > 0.
(Notice that the subscript m (resp. n) indicates the policy choices of the Mafia-type (resp.
accountable) government).
Rents are collected as a percentage of the local public spending, but, in line with the evidence
provided in many official reports1, we make the assumption that different types of expenditure
allow for a different collection of rents. For simplicity, we assume that rents can be collected at
a fixed rate 1 > s > 0 from public expenditure on good g (say, waste management), while no
rents can be collected from public expenditure on service q (say, kindergartens)2.
The objective function of a typical local government can therefore be written as
maxg,q,t (1− λ)sg + λu(c, q, (1− s)g) (1)
where the first part captures the rents accruing from providing g, while the second accounts for
the welfare to be granted to citizens.
2.1. Optimal choices
By substituting for the consumer and government’s budget constraints into the objective function
of the government, Eq. (1) can be rewritten as:
maxg,t L = (1− λ)sg + λu((1− t− pit
2
2
)y;T + ty − g; (1− s)g) (2)
The first order conditions (FOC) with respect to t and g for interior solutions give:
Lg = (1− λ)s− λuq + λug(1− s) = 0 (3)
Lt = −λuc(1 + pit)y + λuqy = 0 (4)
Provided that the marginal utility of a good is only slightly affected by a marginal increase in
the consumption of any other good (i.e., cross derivatives are not too large), the second order
conditions (SOC) for a local maximum are also satisfied (see Appendix A). Manipulating, the
FOC conditions can be rewritten as
uq = uc(1 + pit); (5)
1See, e.g., Italian Ministry of Defense, Tra attivita` della criminalita` organizzata e spesa pubblica in Calabria,
Cuneo, Roma, 2004.
2The international best-seller by Roberto Saviano (2008) indeed reports the reasons why mafia-type
organizations active in the provinces of Napoli and Caserta decided to focus on waste collection and management.
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(1− λ)s/λ = uc(1 + pit)− ug(1− s). (6)
As criminal organizations use violence, hence λn > λm, notice that a lower value of λ implies
a higher value of the difference between uc(1 + pit) (equal to uq at the optimum) and ug(1− s).
By quasi-concavity and continuous differentiability of u(.) this immediately implies:
Proposition 1 With respect to an accountable government, a mafia-type local government will
fix an higher tax rate. It will also deliver a greater (lower) amount of the good on which rent
extraction is feasible (unfeasible).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Intuitively, a mafia-controlled government, less constrained in its choices by the need to gain
citizens’ support, will choose a higher level of the tax rate. More important, it will also choose
to increase the provision of the good that allows it to collect rents, reducing instead expenditure
on the other type of good.
Comparative statics exercises (reported in Appendix A) also show that g, q, and t are
all increasing function of y. Hence, if mafia-controlled governments prevail in lower income
communities, we expect lower taxation in these communities and a greater proportion of total
expenditure financing the provision of the goods and services from which it is easier to extract
rents.
Less obvious is the effect of an increase in s, the rent extraction rate. To evaluate its impact
it is advantageous to get rid of the ambiguity that cross effects – likely to be negligible – carry
with them. That is why, in doing comparative static exercises, we resort to the hypothesis of a
utility function separable in c, g, q.
Proposition 2 Assume u(.) to be separable. Then, if the following condition holds 1−λλ ≥
ug(1− (1− s)εg), where εg = −uggug g is the elasticity of the marginal utility of good g with respect
to its provision, then a marginal increase in s induces: i) an increase in the equilibrium level of
the tax rate; ii) an increase in the provision of the good on which rent extraction is feasible; iii)
a decrease in the provision of the good on which rent extraction is unfeasible. The opposite is
true if the inequality is reversed.
Proof. See Appendix A.
To understand the previous proposition, notice that, as an increase in s allows more rent
extraction, it might induce an higher tax rate as well as greater expenditure on g; on the
other hand, however, an increase in s also reduces the (marginal) utility that the consumer
obtains from the consumption of g. To evaluate the effect of an increase in s on taxation
and the provision of services, it is therefore necessary to compare the importance given by
the government to citizens’ welfare, inversely related to 1−λλ , with the utility gains individuals
obtain from marginally increasing the provision of the good on which rent extraction is possible,
ug(1− (1− s)εg). A mafia-type government is more likely to react to an increase in the rate of
exploitation s by increasing g and reducing q, as 1−λλ is larger and ug is smaller for this type of
government (as it is εg). Hence, an increase in s might reduce distortions in expenditure where
the government is accountable, while it might increase for mafia-types.
Finally, notice also that, from the previous proposition, a larger value of pi, that is, greater
efficiency loss associated to taxation, implies a lower tax rate and lower level of expenditure in
both goods.
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2.2. A reform reducing tax autonomy
The empirical analysis in the next section focuses on a reform reducing municipal fiscal autonomy,
substituting (at supposedly unchanged total revenues) a local tax with transfers from the Central
government. Municipalities can in principle react to this change by modifying the composition
of public expenditure and the amount of revenues accruing from other local taxes. However, as it
will become clear below, because of the abolition of local tax, local governments lost their main
source of fiscal autonomy, and the room for discretion was indeed very limited.
To gain some insights on the likely effect of the reform, we will first consider two polar
cases, and then match them together. In the first case, we model the reform as just an exogenous
increase in transfers: governments are free in setting the local tax rate and public expenditure. In
the second case, we assume transfers to substitute (a share of) an autonomous source of revenue:
governments are not allowed to make compensate changes in the residual (if any) tax revenues.
Finally, we assume transfers to substitute (a share of) an autonomous source of revenue, but we
also allow local government to make compensate changes in the residual tax base. Let us begin
with the former case:
Proposition 3 Assuming u(.) to be separable, a marginal change in the amount of resources
available from the central government, ∆T , induces, at the local level, a reduction in the
equilibrium tax rate t, as well as an increase in the provision of any good publicly provided,
irrespective of whether rent extraction is associated with public provision or not.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus, the extra revenues accruing from the Central government, would be shared between an
higher rent and higher citizens’ welfare, allowing for both a lower level of taxation at the local
level t, and a higher level of expenditure in both goods. This effect is common to both types
of government, although mafia-type governments might presumably increase the ratio between
g and q.
To discuss the second case, let us rewrite the budget constraint as follows:
T + θty + (1− θ)ty = q + g
where 1 ≥ θ > 0. The assumption here is that the increased transfer ∆T would now cover exactly
θty (where t is the tax optimally chosen by the government in the original equilibrium), letting
the local government with only (1− θ)ty of autonomous tax revenue.
Assuming first that t is fixed at the original level, the only relevant behavioural equation is
(3). Deriving this equation and assuming that ∆T is not too large with respect to total revenues,
the effect can be approximated as
∆g ∼= − 1
uqq + ugg(1− s)2 (uqc − ugc(1− s))y(1 + pit)∆T ; ∆g = −∆q;
where all derivatives are evaluated at the original equilibrium. Intuitively, if the increased transfer
just substitutes existing tax revenues and the local government cannot adjust the residual tax
rates, total revenues will remain unchanged after the reform, and the government’s only possible
choice margin is to change the composition of public expenditure. In turn, the government will
do it, only if an increase in private consumption differently affects the marginal utility of any
good publicly provided. Thus, for instance if uqc > 0 (meaning that the marginal utility that
the consumer obtains from consuming q when c increases also increases), while ugc < 0 (meaning
that the marginal utility from consuming g when c increases instead decreases), the government
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will react compensating consumers by increasing the provision of g; if uqc = ugc = 0, there will
be no change in the composition of public expenditure. Notice that the effect on g increases with
θ, as more taxes are substituted by transfers (∆T = θty), and also increases with the welfare loss
induced by taxation, pi. Intuitively, a higher pi imposes a higher costs on citizens for unit of tax
revenues; therefore the effect of the reform will be more beneficial for the consumer, increasing
private consumption even further.
Finally, let us put these two pieces of analysis together, assuming that when the Central
government substitutes θty with extra transfers, the local government still retains the possibility
of changing t on the residual tax base, (1−θ)y. The following proposition summarizes the result:
Proposition 4 Consider a marginal change in T , ∆T = θty, and suppose that the government
adjusts public expenditure and the tax rate t on the residual tax base. If i) u(.) is separable or
ii) (uqc−ugc(1− s)) < 0, the local government reduces the tax rate and the provision of the good
on which rent extraction is possible. Furthermore, with a separable utility function it is increased
the provision of the good on which rent extraction is unfeasible.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Unsurprisingly, the results in this case is a mixture of the two polar cases. Cross derivatives
effects tend to introduce a lot of ambiguities, but if we eliminate them by assuming separability
in the utility function (or if we assume the cross effects to be small, as is likely to be the case)
the picture is clear. As in the case of an exogenous increase in transfers, municipalities will react
to the reform by reducing the tax rate on the residual tax base, because of the beneficial effects
of the reduction of tax distortions on consumer’s utility (an income effect). With separability,
or if there is larger complementarity between good q and private consumption (as in the second
polar case), government will also reduce expenditure on g and increases instead expenditure on
q. If instead there is a large complementarity between good g and private consumption, the effect
will in general be ambiguous, as the wish of government to increase expenditure on g might lead
the former effects on t and q to be reversed in sign. Even assuming separability, with generic
utility functions, it is impossible to sign unambiguously the difference of behaviour between the
two types of government, although it is plausible that – ceteris paribus – the mafia-controlled
governments would again spend a larger part of the increased net revenue on g, as rents matter
more for this government.
Summing up, our simple model produces the following predictions. First, as mafia-type
municipalities can afford to care less for the welfare of citizens, we should expect these
governments to tax citizens more, employing the additional resources to increase the provision
of the goods producing rents. In all cases, taking into account potential differences in the tax
base across municipalities, the share of expenditure on these types of goods for mafia-type local
governments should be higher than for accountable governments. Second, in its decision about
public goods provision a mafia-type municipality should also be more sensible to increases in the
rent extraction rate, being more likely as a result to increase expenditure on the rent producing
public good. However, the effect of a reform affecting the degree of tax autonomy – on which
we concentrate our empirical analysis below – is generally ambiguous; an ambiguity that also
depends on the (real) margins of autonomy enjoyed by municipalities. In general, we expect a
downward pressure on local revenues and an increase in public expenditure, particularly for the
good less prone to rent seeking. A mafia-type local government might counteract these forces,
however, keeping unchanged or even increasing expenditure on goods producing rents, as rents
matter more for this type of government.
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3. Institutional background
3.1. Mafia controlled municipalities
Municipalities are the level of government closest to citizens in the Italian architecture of
governments. Any municipality is governed by a mayor, directly voted by citizens and supported
by an elected council holding office for five years. Elections can take place before the natural
end of the mandate either when the majority of the council members distrust the mayor, or
when the President of the Italian Republic, following the suggestion of the Ministry of Domestic
Affairs, dismiss the municipal council by decree. The dismissal of the council can happen only
in very specific circumstances (Law n. 142/1990): the council must be either responsible of
acts contrary to the Italian laws, or must be unable to approve the budget and to fulfil its
duties. One reason for this to happen has been specified by the Law 221/1991 (modified with
the Legislative Decree 267/2000): the municipal council can be dismissed when there are reasons
to believe that mafia-type organizations are able to influence (or control) a relevant part of
council members with sensible effects either on the functioning of the council itself or on the
nature of the decisions it takes. Until 2016, the official statistics provided by the Italian Ministry
of Domestic Affairs report 204 cases of dismissed municipal councils, with the highest number
in the Region Campania (70, mostly in the Provinces of Naples and Caserta), followed by the
Region Calabria (61, mostly in the Province of Reggio Calabria), and the Region Sicilia (53,
mostly in the Province of Palermo). These three regions are all in the South of Italy, where GDP
per capita is historically below national average income, also for the presence of strong criminal
organizations (e.g., Pinotti, 2015).
When the municipal council is dismissed for the influence of Mafia-type organizations, a
commission composed by three external members is appointed to rule the municipality for up
to 18 months, until new elections are held. The aim pursued by the legislator is to “clean
out” the environment before fair elections can take place. This would require getting rid of the
circumstances which made it possible for Mafia-type organizations to influence the activity of
the city council. However, as it has been emphasized in many official reports (e.g., Parliament
Anti-Mafia Commission, 2005), the available evidence shows that the dismissal of the municipal
council never represents, by itself, a way to really stop the influence of Mafia-type organizations.
The reason must be found in the fact that these kind of organizations profoundly influences the
institutional environment. They acquire extensive power in a local context because, within a
community, shared values and informal social norms allow a broad social support to (closed)
elites, whose primary objective is that of conditioning the allocation of resources – hence also
the activity of the policy-maker – through the use (or the menace) of violence, which is what
really distinguishes a Mafia-type organization from any other ruling elite3. As such norms and
values persist in the long run, the decision to dismiss the council in order to stop the influence of
Mafia-type elites on the policy-makers cannot be decisive. In fact, it is not infrequent that the
council of a given municipality is dismissed more than once4.
Since the control of Mafia-type organizations can be viewed as a structural characteristic of
a given municipality, the dismissal of the city council at least once, up to 2016, is considered in
the empirical exercise below as a first rough indicator of a “weak” institutional environment. In
3According to the pluralist view of the ruling elite model (e.g., Dahl, 1958), in order to establish the existence
of a ruling elite, it is sufficient that the following conditions are satisfied: the hypothetical ruling elite constitutes
a well-defined group; there is a sample of cases involving key political decisions in which the preferences of the
ruling elite run counter to those of any other likely group that might be suggested; the preferences of the elite
regularly prevail.
4In this sense, our work differs from Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco (2016), who implicitly support the idea that
the collusion between elected officials and the mafia comes to an end when the council is dismissed.
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these municipalities we expect that prevailing social norms allowing broad support to Mafia clans
will not generate social outcomes driven by both generalized voluntary exchanges and (legal)
codified procedures for policy making (on this see also Gambetta, 1996). The implications
of such institutional weaknesses, and the capture of local governments, will distort the fiscal
exchange between local politicians and voters, so undermining the potential increase of electoral
accountability that could be obtained via tax decentralization.
3.2. The tax reform
As in other countries, Italian municipalities are in charge of a wide array of local services, such
as administrative services (including, for instance, the registry office), waste management, and
some social services (like childcare and elderly care). According to aggregate national data,
until 2008 about two thirds of municipal expenditures were funded with autonomous revenues.
These own revenues accrued for the most part from a local property tax, the so-called Imposta
Comunale sugli Immobili (ICI from now on). This tax was applied to both household and
business properties, according to a set of general rules defined at the national level. However,
municipalities were allowed to freely modify some parameters of the tax, such as the rates within
a given range, as well as the tax credits for the main residence. Before being partially suppressed
in 2008, ICI brought about almost one fourth of total municipal revenues.5
The 2008 tax reform (Law Decree n. 93/2008, converted in the Law n. 126/2008) was an
urgent measure proposed by the Central government to sustain households’ consumption in the
wake of the financial crisis. The government suppressed for the ongoing year 2008, the payment of
ICI on the property used as the main residence by households. The foregone revenues (estimated
in about 1.7 billion euro by the government, and in 3 billion euro by ANCI-IFEL, the Association
of Italian Municipalities) had to be reimbursed to municipalities via an increase in transfers. In
particular, the transfers have been computed for each municipality to compensate exactly the lost
revenues from the main residence, minus some minor adjustments to account for the efficiency in
cashing the tax, the respect of the Internal Stability Pact (a set of fiscal rules aimed at controlling
deficits in larger municipalities), and the financial difficulties of very small municipalities.
The unambiguous effect of the reform is a reduction in local tax autonomy; and – according
to the theoretical model above – we would expect an increase in public expenditure, particularly
for goods less prone to rent seeking for municipalities accountable towards citizens, but not for
Mafia-type local governments, which – being more interested to rents – might even increase
spending on goods producing rents. The empirical test below aims at unconvering these different
behaviours.
4. The empirical analysis
4.1. Data and descriptive evidence
We collected data on expenditures, revenues, institutional quality and various socio-demographic
and political characteristics for a panel of 348 municipalities belonging to the provinces of Naples,
Caserta and Salerno, over the time period 2003-2011.6 We focus our analysis on these three
5Other two important local taxes are represented by a surcharge on the Personal Income Tax (Addizionale
Comunale IRPEF) and by a specific tax for waste collection and management (TARSU). As for the first,
municipalities can only slightly modify the tax rate. As for the second, it is computed relying on a vague
proxy of waste production. Further institutional details on Italian municipalities can be found in, e.g., Boetti et
al. (2012).
6Since 2012, ICI have been suppressed and substituted with a different tax, partially shared between the State
and the municipalities.
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provinces in Campania because – according to official statistics – these are those with the highest
number of municipalities controlled by Mafia-type organizations, and these organizations are all
Camorra clans (which are different in their organization and their behavior by other Italian
mafias, ’Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra; e.g., Catino, 2014; Scaglione, 2016). Our primary data
sources are the budgets of Italian municipalities published by the Ministry of Domestic Affairs
(the so-called Certificati di Conto Consuntivo) and the statistics on the dismissed municipal
councils because of Mafia influences published by the Anti-Mafia Commission of the Italian
Parliament. Other complementary pieces of information about different characteristics of the
municipalities have been obtained by both the regional datasets elaborated by the Italian
National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) and the Historical Archive of Elections published by
the Ministry of Domestic Affairs.
Considering a rough classification of institutional environments based on municipal council
dismissal, our sample includes 282 municipalities with a “strong” institutional environment, free
from the control of Mafia (for a total of 2,335 observations) and 66 municipalities characterized
by “weak” institutions, under the control of Mafia-type organizations (for a total of 555
observations).7 According to the theoretical model above, we define the dummy variable NM
to identify the first type of municipalities, those not captured by a Mafia-type organization. To
identify the impact of the tax reform, we also define the dummy TAXREF , which takes value
one for the last four years in the sample (2008-2011), when the main residence was exempted
from the local property tax base, implying a lower degree of tax decentralization and lower
incentives to control opportunistic behaviour. Table 1 shows the average share of own revenues
from ICI on total current revenues and the average ICI value per capita, distinguishing between
the two periods before (2003-2007) and after (2008-2011) the tax reform, and the two types of
municipalities according to the quality of local institutions. We observe a clear reduction of
fiscal autonomy of local governments following the reform, as reflected by the decrease of 3-4
percentage points in the ICI share and about 10-12 euro in the ICI per capita revenues, for both
groups of municipalities. Given this observed symmetry in the dynamics of local tax revenues,
we are interested in checking whether the reaction of the municipalities in terms of spending
following the reform differs across the two types of municipalities. Preliminary insights on this
issue are provided by Figure 1 and Table 2.
Table 1: Own revenues from local property tax (ICI) by tax decentralization and
institutional quality: average share (%) on total current revenues and average value
per capita (e)
TAXREF
0 1
NM Share (%) Per capita (e) Share (%) Per capita (e)
0 0.18 106 0.15 94
1 0.16 108 0.12 98
All groups 0.17 108 0.13 97
Note: NM = 0 indicates municipalities captured by the Mafia, while NM = 1 those not captured by the
Mafia. TAXREF = 0 refers to the years from 2003 to 2007, when the property tax applied also on the main
residence; TAXREF = 1 refers to the years from 2008 to 2011, when tax decentralization has been reduced.
Figure 1 shows the average yearly municipal current expenditure per capita (TOTAL EXP )
for the two groups of municipalities in the two periods: a parallel trend across groups emerges
7The panel is clearly unbalanced. We discuss this issue in the robustness checks below.
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Figure 1: Average municipal expenditure per capita (TOTAL EXP ) by year and
institutional quality
Table 2: Average municipal expenditure per capita (TOTAL EXP ) by degree of tax
decentralization and institutional quality
TAXREF
0 1 Diff.
0 560 (147) 617 (151) 57
NM 1 638 (193) 745 (294) 107
Diff. 77 127 50
Note: Standard deviations in round brackets. NM = 0 indicates municipalities captured by
the Mafia, while NM = 1 those not captured by the Mafia. TAXREF = 0 refers
to the years from 2003 to 2007, when the property tax applied also on the main residence;
TAXREF = 1 refers to the years from 2008 to 2011, when tax decentralization has been reduced.
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until 2007, while a marked jump is observed only for treated municipalities in 2008, when the
reform kicks in. This evidence of “fiscally responsible” Camorra clans is confirmed in Table 2:
the tax reform reducing autonomy brings about an average expenditure increase of 57 euro in
mafia captured municipalities, while TOTAL EXP grows up to 107 euro for those not captured,
with a difference of 50 euro across the two groups.
Before moving to a rigorous test of the statistical significance of this difference using regression
analysis, it is worth noticing that the higher average expenditure levels reported in Figure 1
and Table 2 for municipalities characterized by a “strong” institutional environment might be
reasonably justified by the provision of public services of higher quality, as suggested by some
studies comparing municipalities with different levels of corruption (e.g., Dal Bo´ and Rossi,
2007; Estache et al., 2009). Unfortunately, information on either the quantity or the quality of
the complete set of services supplied by municipalities is unavailable; thus we cannot directly
check the relationship between the influence of Mafia clans and the general performance of
municipalities in public service provision. However, at least for waste management, we can
provide some evidence showing that expenditure is higher but services are of lower quality in
mafia-controlled municipalities with respect to non-controlled ones. Waste management is an
important example for two reasons: first, it represents, on average, a share of about 20% of
municipal current spending in our sample; second, and most importantly, it is the typical context
strongly plagued by widespread corruption and entrenched presence of organized crime (e.g.,
D’Amato et al., 2015). Available data for the 2007-2009 period confirm the worst performance
in garbage collection for the group of municipalities captured by Mafia clans: from Table 3, the
average tons of collected waste per capita when NM = 1 are about 6 times higher than those
collected when NM = 0, with a variability in the ratio across provinces that ranges from about
5 times in the case of Caserta to almost 20 times in the case of Salerno. Similar differences are
likely to characterize also the provision of other local services and help understand the higher
expenditure registered for municipalities not captured by Camorra clans.
Table 3: Tons of collected waste per capita by Province and institutional quality
(average values over the period 2007–2009)
PROVINCE
NM Naples Caserta Salerno All
0 0.69 0.89 0.19 0.72
1 4.14 4.97 3.82 4.25
Note: NM = 0 indicates municipalities captured by the Mafia, while NM = 1 those not
captured by the Mafia.
4.2. Identification and estimation
The general specification of the model used to estimate the impact of the tax reform on our main
outcome variable TOTAL EXP is represented by the following equation:
TOTAL EXPit = βTAXREFt ×NMi + γXit + δt + θi + εit (7)
where the coefficient of interest is β, which picks up the differential impact of the tax reform on
municipalities not captured by the Mafia clans with respect to those captured. As the tax reform
is exogenously imposed by the Central government to all Italian municipalities, β is identifying
the causal impact of a decrease in tax autonomy on municipal spending. X is a vector of control
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variables that can vary both across municipalities and time, which includes: socio-demographic
variables like the size and the age composition of the population8, the municipal income per
capita, the population density; political economy variables like the end of the mandate, whether
the mayor is term limited or not, whether ruling parties belong to a civic list, mayor’s gender, the
political alignment of municipal government with higher government tiers. All these variables
have been shown to play an important role in government budget choices around the world (e.g.,
Besley and Case, 2003; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Arulampalam et al., 2009; Bordignon
et al., 2016). We also include in vector X a control for whether an external commission imposed
by the Central government after the dismissal of the municipal council is in charge. Finally,
we include in the model a whole set of municipality i and year t fixed effects to account for
unobserved residual heterogeneity across local governments (e.g., in terms of the voting system or
the presence of fiscal rules), and the influence of other possible time-varying factors common both
to treatment and control groups. In all the estimates, we cluster standard errors at the municipal
level to consider possible heteroschedasticity and within-group correlation. The definition and
the summary statistics for all the variables are reported in Table 4.
One main issue in identification is the definition of municipalities not captured by Camorra
clans. We start our analysis with a very simple and conservative approach, by taking NM = 1
for all municipalities whose council has never been dismissed. These are municipalities with a
strong institutional environment. However, one can think to several problems for this sharp
classification. For instance, clans might be so strong to corrupt prosecutors and judges, so to
avoid the dismissal of municipal council. Or they might have ties with politicians and judges
at higher levels of government, again favouring the status quo. For all these reasons, in order
to check the robustness of our findings, we also define a continuous indicator of institutional
quality, NMD. The basic idea is that clans can more easily expand their criminal activity in
places closer to the ones they have already infected. Hence, NMD is equal to zero when the
council has been dismissed at least once (NM = 0), but takes values in the range (0, 1] for
municipalities not captured by Mafia clans, according to the average distance (in kilometers) of
each municipality from those captured by clans. More precisely, NMD is equal to 1 only for
the “best” municipality among those whose council has never been dismissed, i.e. the one with
the largest average distance (143 km) from the municipalities captured by Mafia clans. The
latter acts as a benchmark for the institutional quality, since the value of NMD for the other
municipalities that officially have not yet been captured by Mafia clans is computed by dividing
their average distance from the captured municipalities for the largest average distance.
Additionally, in order to check whether – as predicted by our theoretical model –
the impact of the tax reform is different across spending categories, we run previous
Eq. (7) on different sub-categories of municipal expenditure. As we do not have
a simple way to classify expenditures according to the ability of clans to collect rents
(g and q in our theoretical model above), we follow anecdotal evidence and define the
following four categories: administrative expenditure (ADMIN EXP ), waste management
expenditure (WASTE EXP ), social expenditure (SOCIAL EXP ), and a residual category
(RESIDUAL EXP ) picking up a range of other services (such as local police, road maintenance
and traffic regulation, parks and recreation areas, support to productive activities), each of which
individually accounts for a very small fraction of the total spending. According to available
evidence (e.g., D’Amato et al., 2015), we expect Mafia clans to collect more easily rents from
waste management spending than from other categories.
8Notice, in particular, that population size is included in the model also with a quadratic term, in order to
control for a U-shaped expenditure function. An analysis of returns to scale in the production of municipal
services in Italy is in, e.g., Boetti et al. (2012).
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4.3. Results
4.3.1. Baseline estimates
Estimates of Eq. (7) are in Table 5. Considering total spending, coefficient on the interaction
term TAXREF × NM is positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the effect is
roughly a 5.6% increase in the average spending (computed on the whole sample) when the
tax reform kicks in for municipalities not captured by Mafia clans with respect to those where
clans rule. When considering sub-definitions of spending, it becomes clear that the impact is
due to the residual spending, which increases of about 35 euro more in NM municipalities,
implying a 17% average increase for this category. Also social spending shows a similar pattern,
even if the coefficient estimate suggests only a 6.7% increase. On the contrary, expenditure
for waste management is characterized by a negative (although not statistically significant)
coefficient: after the reform, municipalities with a strong institutional environment reduced this
spending by 4.50 euro with respect to those captured, roughly a 4% differential decrease as a
consequence of the reform. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of our theoretical
model: municipalities free from clans’ influence increase public spending for local public goods
less prone to rent seeking, while mafia-controlled governments – caring less about the welfare of
their citizens – spend more resources on local public goods which are more able to produce rents.
As for controls, most are insignificant after controlling for time and municipality fixed effects.
Coefficients for population (POP and POP2) suggests the presence of a non-linear relationship,
with the notable exception of waste management spending. The share of young out of the
total population (BOY ) shows mostly a positive relationship with municipal expenditure, while
the share of old people (OLD) is positively and significantly correlated only with spending for
waste management. Coefficient for income (INCOME) is negative and significant only for
administrative spending, likely picking up the efficiency in the production of municipal services.
Looking at political economy variables we observe a scattered pattern of significant coefficients:
social expenditure grows as next elections approach (Y GOV ); when the municipal council is
governed by a civic (non-party) list (CIV IC) we observe an increase in waste expenditure and a
decrease in residual spending; a similar pattern arises for the presence of an external commission
imposed by the Central government after the dismissal of the municipal council (COMM);
as for the alignment of the municipal council with higher levels of governments, a negative
coefficient is estimated for the alignment with national government (ALIG ITA) in the case
of total expenditure and the two sub-categories of social spending and residual spending, while
a positive relationship arises between the alignment with provincial government and residual
expenditure; finally, mayor’s gender (MAYORSEX) seems to be important only in the case of
administrative expenditure, which reduces when the mayor is a female.
4.3.2. Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our main results in different directions. First, we simply substitute the
sharp definition of Mafia-controlled municipalities with one that takes into account the possibility
for Camorra clans to extend their power in close territories, although for the latter the infiltrations
of clans have not yet been “officially” detected. In particular, using the continuous indicator of
institutional quality NMD, based on the average distance between each municipality and the
captured ones, the coefficient for the interaction TAXREF × NMD is even more significant
and stronger in magnitude for all spending categories (Table 6): we observe now an increase in
TOTAL EXP which ranges from about 2% for the municipalities with the smallest distance
from the captured ones (19 km) to almost 18% for the municipality with the largest distance;
a similar variability in spending growth is found for ADMIN EXP (1-9%), SOCIAL EXP
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Table 5: Impact of tax reform on municipal current expenditure per capita
VARIABLES TOTAL ADMIN WASTE SOCIAL RESIDUAL
TAXREF × NM 37.453*** 2.618 -4.498 4.580** 35.426***
(11.827) (5.556) (3.955) (1.909) (9.225)
POP -42.742*** -15.524*** 0.848 -7.239*** -21.043***
(8.200) (4.212) (4.487) (1.837) (5.832)
POP2 0.225*** 0.058*** 0.003 0.043*** 0.122***
(0.044) (0.021) (0.021) (0.009) (0.030)
OLD -0.009 -0.008 0.008*** -0.003 -0.007
(0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)
BOY 0.018*** 0.012** 0.003 0.002* 0.001
(0.007) (0.005) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
INCOME -0.004 -0.007*** -0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
DENS 0.002 0.003 -0.038* 0.015 0.022
(0.035) (0.019) (0.021) (0.010) (0.020)
YGOV -2.112 -0.664 0.207 -0.565*** -0.886
(1.776) (0.609) (0.377) (0.212) (1.627)
GOV2 -7.623 -1.240 -0.820 1.248 -7.145
(11.420) (5.326) (3.777) (3.807) (6.249)
CIVIC -12.633 -3.938 9.217* 0.705 -18.838**
(11.408) (5.307) (5.032) (2.568) (7.673)
COMM -12.523 -8.235 11.529** -1.486 -15.062**
(11.267) (6.301) (4.481) (2.078) (7.256)
ALIG PROV 7.775 -3.584 -3.703 3.383 11.969**
(8.066) (4.071) (4.351) (3.060) (5.849)
ALIG REG 2.698 1.338 2.327 0.656 -1.705
(8.035) (4.427) (4.835) (2.823) (6.087)
ALIG ITA -12.620** -0.959 0.363 -2.566** -9.594*
(6.195) (2.429) (1.890) (1.215) (4.887)
MAYORSEX -9.205 -15.845* -1.442 0.519 7.213
(15.443) (9.207) (4.080) (3.377) (12.791)
F 25.460 6.807 29.340 6.325 8.332
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nr. observ. 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890
Nr. municip. 348 348 348 348 348
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All estimates include municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets.
16
(2-18%) and RESIDUAL EXP (6-46%, again the category with the highest increase), while
– as expected – WASTE EXP shows an opposite reaction, with a reduction from 1% for the
smallest distance to 9% for the largest distance.
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis: continuous indicator of institutional quality
VARIABLES TOTAL ADMIN WASTE SOCIAL RESIDUAL
TAXREF × NMD 117.479*** 23.016** -11.214* 12.018*** 95.289***
(27.650) (9.649) (6.717) (3.818) (25.010)
F 29.000 7.192 29.130 6.500 7.936
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nr. observ. 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890
Nr. municip. 348 348 348 348 348
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All estimates include municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and the
vector X of control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipa-
lity level are reported in round brackets. NMD is a continuous indicator of insti-
tutional quality that is equal to 0 for municipalities captured by the Mafia and as-
sumes a value in the range (0, 1] for municipalities not captured, according to the
average kilometric distance of each municipality from the captured ones.
Second, we redefine our empirical model in an event-study framework (Table 7), by interacting
our original dummy for the municipalities free from the influence of Camorra clans NM with a
full set of year dummies (using 2003 as the reference year). This allows us to both check formally
for the common trend assumption, including anticipatory effects (Y ear04×NM , Y ear05×NM ,
Y ear06 × NM and Y ear07 × NM), and to better characterize the impact of the tax reform
after its introduction, including post-treatments effects (Y ear09 × NM , Y ear10 × NM and
Y ear11×NM). As for the common trend, results are reassuring: coefficients for the years 2004-
2007 are mostly insignificant for all spending categories (exceptions are only waste spending in
2006 and 2007 and residual spending in 2005), hence we do not detect any different trend prior
to the reform between the two groups of municipalities. As for the impact of the reform, it seems
that its differential effect is mainly concentrated in the year 2008 when the tax reform kicks in
(e.g., +12% for TOTAL EXP ), and then it reduces remarkably in the following years (e.g., only
+5% in 2011 for TOTAL EXP ). This evidence confirms what has been already highlighted
by comparing the spending trends of the two groups of municipalities before and after the tax
reform in Figure 1. Finally, we check also the stability of our results with respect to the use
of a balanced panel data set, limiting the analysis only to municipalities for which relevant
information are available for all the years analyzed. One reason to do so is the suspect that –
for some municipalities – data are missing because of accounting irregularities, which might be
connected with the influence of Mafia-controlling organizations. In this case, there would be a
problem of sample selection bias, and fixed effects estimates would be inconsistent (Cameron
and Trivedi, 2010). After removing from the sample municipalities with budget information
missing for at least one year, we remain with 203 municipalities, for a total of 1,827 observations.
More precisely, 42 are municipalities under the control of Mafia-clans while 161 are not captured
municipalities (a reduction of equal proportions for the two groups of municipalities, about 40%,
compared to the original sample size). The complete set of estimates (including descriptive
evidence and the full set of regression models) are shown in Tables 1B-6B and Figure 1B in
Appendix B and substantially confirms the findings obtained with the unbalanced data set.
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Hence, the potential sample selection bias does not appear to be a relevant issues in our study.
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis: event study framework
VARIABLES TOTAL ADMIN WASTE SOCIAL RESIDUAL
Year04 × NM -2.223 0.121 -6.073 -0.336 4.563
(10.697) (6.061) (4.270) (1.892) (6.112)
Year05 × NM 0.724 -6.742 -6.173 0.115 14.690*
(13.003) (7.627) (4.133) (2.374) (8.414)
Year06 × NM -3.845 -3.328 -12.151** 3.454 9.203
(14.316) (6.794) (5.627) (2.880) (10.573)
Year07 × NM 12.250 2.478 -10.527* 4.176 16.379
(15.007) (7.022) (5.580) (2.806) (10.602)
Year08 × NM 82.420*** 10.336 -26.507*** 9.786*** 92.176***
(29.536) (7.419) (6.281) (3.654) (27.235)
Year09 × NM 7.650 -9.244 -12.572* 4.218 25.720**
(18.905) (12.225) (6.684) (3.320) (11.512)
Year10 × NM 27.463* -0.581 -2.569 3.509 27.627**
(15.901) (7.158) (6.879) (3.300) (11.975)
Year11 × NM 33.080** 3.145 -3.654 6.666* 27.371**
(16.268) (7.922) (6.797) (3.577) (11.913)
F 20.230 6.129 25.020 5.849 6.862
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nr. observ. 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890 2,890
Nr. municip. 348 348 348 348 348
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All estimates include municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and
the vector X of control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level are reported in round brackets. Year04 × NM, Year05 × NM,
Year06 × NM, and Year07 × NM are anticipatory effects (leads), while
Year09 × NM, Year10 × NM and Year11 × NM are post–treatment effects (lags);
Year08 × NM refers to the effect of tax reform in the year of its adoption (2008).
5. Concluding remarks
To work as an accountability mechanism, fiscal decentralization requires the democratic
mechanism to function well. This might not be the case where the quality of the institutional
environment is weak, and local governments are captured by local oligarchs. In this paper, we
explore this issue by studying the reaction of municipalities to an unexpected tax reform reducing
tax autonomy at the local level, which was implemented by the Central government with the
aim of sustaining private consumption in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis. We focus our
analysis on municipalities belonging to three provinces in Southern Italy, which share a common
type of mafia organization – the Camorra clans, vividly discussed in Saviano’s Gomorrah – and
identify the presence of a weak institutional environment exploiting a law that allow the Central
government to dismiss the municipal councils when there are reasons to believe that they are
captured by clans.
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Our estimates suggest that only municipalities not controlled by Camorra clans increased
spending as a reaction to the reduction in tax autonomy. In particular, this holds true for social
spending as well as a residual category of spending picking up a variety of local services. On the
contrary, we find evidence of a reduction in spending for waste management, a peculiar category
of municipal expenditure which might be more prone than others to the ability of clans to extract
rents.
Overall, our findings have strong implications for the ongoing discussion on the benefits which
can be gained from decentralization. In particular, while the literature has shown that the degree
of tax autonomy is crucial for the incentives coming from decentralization to work properly, our
work provides support also to the quality of local institutions: to be effective, decentralization
also requires a strong institutional environment, which allows the democratic mechanism to
work well. In contexts where local institutions are potentially subject to the capture by powerful
interest groups, and the institutional environment is weak, some caution is then needed before
deciding to devolve more fiscal power to lower tiers of government.
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Appendix A
Second order conditions
Differentiating the FOC further, we get the following derivatives:
Lgg = λ(uqq + ugg(1− s)2 − 2uqg(1− s));
Ltt = λy
2(ucc(1 + pit)
2 − 2ucq(1 + pit) + uqq − uc piy );
Ltg = λy(−uqq + uqc(1 + pit)− ugc(1− s)(1 + pit) + uqg(1− s));
Inspection shows that by quasi-concavity of u(.), Lgg < 0 and Ltt < 0. Assuming Ltg > 0
and LggLtt > (Ltg)
2, the Hessian of the second derivatives is negative definite, implying that the
FOC identifies a (local) maximum. Notice that by assuming separability of the utility function,
ucg = uqg = uqc = 0. Substituting in the equations above,
Lgg = λ(uqq + ugg(1− s)2) < 0
Ltt = λy
2(ucc(1 + pit)
2 + uqq − uc piy ) < 0
Ltg = λy(−uqq) > 0,
The SOC are then satisfied.
Comparative statics.
Fully differentiating the FOC above and assuming that one parameter r changes each time,
where r = s, y, T, pi, we can get the effects of a change in the parameter on the two choices
variables: Lgg Lgt
Ltg Ltt
dg
dt
 = −dr
Lgr
Ltr

Implying: dgdr
dt
dr
 = −
Lgg Lgt
Ltg Ltt
−1 Lgr
Ltr

Remembering that A−1 = 1det(A) ∗Adj(A), where Adj(A) is the adjiugate of A, we can writedgdr
dt
dr
 = − 1
∆
 Ltt −Lgt
−Ltg Lgg
Lgr
Ltr

where ∆ = LggLtt − (Ltg)2 > 0. Finally, fully differentiating the budget constraint, we get
the effect of a small change in r on q: dqdr = dT +
dt
dry + tdy − dgdr .
Proof. (Proposition 2).
Changes in s.
Assuming separability of the utility function, Lgs = (1−λ)−λug−λuggg(1−s); and Lts = 0.
It follows:
dg/ds = − 1∆ (LttLgs); dt/ds = 1∆ (LgtLgs); dq/ds = 1∆Lgs(yLgt + Ltt)
Notice that (yLgt +Ltt) = (λy
2(−uqq) +λy2(ucc(1 +pit)2 +uqq −uc piy ) = (λy2(ucc(1 +pit)2−
uc
pi
yLgs) < 0
It follows that if Lgs > 0, dg/ds > 0, dt/ds > 0, dq/ds < 0, while all signs are reversed if
Lgs ≤ 0. Now,
22
Lgs > 0 if
(1−λ)
λ > ug(1 + (1− s)uggug g) = ug(1− (1− s)εg), where εg = −
ugg
ug
g > 0.
Changes in pi.
Assuming separability of the utility function, Lgpi = 0; and Ltpi = −λucty+λucc(1+pit)y2 t22 <
0. It follows:
dg/dpi = 1∆LtgLtpi < 0; dt/dpi = − 1∆LggLtpi < 0;
dq/dpi = dtdpiy − dgdpi = − 1∆Ltpi(yLgg + Ltg) = − 1∆Ltpi(λy(uqq + ugg(1− s)2) + λy(−uqq)) =
= − 1∆Ltpi(λyugg(1− s)2) < 0.
Changes in y.
Assuming separability of the utility function,
Lgy = −λuqqt > 0; Lty = −λucc(1 + pit)y(1− t− pit22 ) > 0. It follows:
dg/dy = − 1∆ (LttLgy − LtgLty) = − 1∆Ltg(tLtt − Lty) > 0;
dt/dy = 1∆ (LtgLgy − LggLty) > 0
dq
dy =
dt
dyy + t− dgdy = t+ 1∆ (−yLggLty + Ltg(yLgy + tLtt − Lty)) > 0.
Proof. (Proposition 3).
Assuming separability of the utility function, LgT = −λuqq > 0; LtT = λuqqy < 0. It follows:
dg/dT = 1∆ (−LttLgT + LtgLtT ) = 1∆λuqq(Ltt + yLtg) =
= 1∆λuqq(λy
2(ucc(1 + pit)
2 + uqq − uc piy ) + λy2(−uqq)) =
= 1∆λ
2y2uqq((ucc(1 + pit)
2 − uc piy ) > 0
dt/dT = − 1∆ (−LtgLgT + LggLtT ) = − 1∆λuqq(−Ltg + yLgg) = − 1∆yλ2uqqugg(1− s)2 < 0
dq/dT = 1 + dtdT y − dgdT =
= 1 + 1∆λ
2uqqy(−ucc(1 + pit)2y + ucpi − yugg(1− s)2) = 1− 1∆λ2yK where
K = −uqq(−ucc(1 + pit)2y + ucpi − yugg(1− s)2) > 0
Now notice: ∆ = LttLgg − (Ltg)2 = LttLgg − λ2y2(uqq)2 =
= λ2y2(uqq(ucc(1 + pit)
2 + uqq − uc piy ) + ugg(1− s)2(ucc(1 + pit)2 + uqq − uc piy )− (uqq)2)
= λ2y2(uqq(ucc(1 + pit)
2 − uc piy ) + ugg(1− s)2(ucc(1 + pit)2 + uqq − uc piy ))
= λ2y(uqq(ucc(1 + pit)
2y − ucpi) + ugg(1− s)2y(ucc(1 + pit)2 + uqq − uc piy ))
= λ2y(uqq(ucc(1 + pit)
2y − ucpi + ugg(1− s)2y) + ugg(1− s)2(ucc(1 + pit)2y − ucpi))
= λ2y(K + ugg(1− s)2(ucc(1 + pit)2y − ucpi)) = λ2y(K +R)
It follows: dq/dT = 1− KK+R > 0, as KK+R < 1.
Proof. (Proposition 4).
Changes in T , to substitute θty, letting local government adjusts t on the residual tax base,
(1− θ)y.
Differentiating the FOC and considering that now the government can only tax a portion of
the tax base, we get:
Lgg = +λuqg + λugg(1− s) < 0
Ltt = (−λucc(1 + pit)2y2 + λuqqy2)(1− θ) < 0
Ltg = +λucq(1 + pit)y − λucg(1 + pit)y(1− s) + λuqc(1 + pit)y2(1− θ)− λuqqy + λuqgy(1− s)
LgT = +(λuqc + λugc(1− s))(1 + pit)y
LtT = (−λuc(1 + pit)y + λuqcy)(1 + pit)y
Notice that now several expressions have changed, in particular Ltt, because of the reduced
tax autonomy of government and because of the effect of the transfer on private consumption.
Applying the formulas above, we get:
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Fact 1: dg/dT = 1∆ (−LttLgT + LtgLtT ); if there are no cross derivative effects, LgT = 0. In
this case, Ltg > 0 and LtT < 0; hence, dg/dT < 0. The same is true if LgT < 0.
Fact 2: dt/dT = − 1∆ (−LtgLgT + LggLtT ); if there are no cross derivative effects, LgT = 0.
In this case, as LtT < 0, dt/dT < 0. The same is true if LgT < 0.
Combining Fact 1 and 2, we prove point i) in Proposition (4).
Finally, totally differentiating the budget constraint with limited tax base we get: dq/dT =
(1− θ)ydt/dT − dg/dT. Sustituting, in the case of separability of the utility function, we get:
dq/dT = (1−θ)y 1∆ (−LggLtT )− 1∆ (LtgLtT ) = − 1∆LtT ((1−θ)yLgg+Ltg) = − 1∆LtTλy(ugg(1−
s)(1− θ)− uqq) = − 1∆LtTλyugg((1− s)(1− θ)− 1) > 0. This proves point ii) of the proposition.
Appendix B
Table 1B: Own revenues from local property tax (ICI) by tax decentralization and
institutional quality: average share (%) on total current revenues and average value
per capita (e) – balanced panel
TAXREF
0 1
NM Share (%) Per capita (e) Share (%) Per capita (e)
0 0.19 110 0.15 99
1 0.16 110 0.13 104
All groups 0.16 110 0.13 103
Note: NM = 0 indicates municipalities captured by the Mafia, while NM = 1
those not captured by the Mafia. TAXREF = 0 refers to the years from 2003
to 2007, when the property tax applied also on the main residence; TAXREF = 1
refers to the years from 2008 to 2011, when tax decentralization has been reduced.
Table 2B: Average municipal expenditure per capita (TOTAL EXP ) by degree of
tax decentralization and institutional quality – balanced panel
TAXREF
0 1 Diff.
0 568 (158) 621 (155) 54
NM 1 652 (207) 771 (341) 119
Diff. 84 150 66
Note: Standard deviations in round brackets. NM = 0 indicates municipalities captured by
the Mafia, while NM = 1 those not captured by the Mafia. TAXREF = 0 refers to the years
from 2003 to 2007, when the property tax applied also on the main residence; TAXREF =
1 refers to the years from 2008 to 2011, when tax decentralization has been reduced.
24
T
a
b
le
3
B
:
S
u
m
m
a
ry
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
o
f
th
e
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
u
se
d
in
th
e
sp
e
n
d
in
g
e
q
u
a
ti
o
n
(7
)
–
b
a
la
n
c
e
d
p
a
n
e
l
V
a
ri
a
b
le
d
e
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
N
a
m
e
M
e
a
n
S
td
.
D
e
v
.
M
in
M
a
x
O
u
tc
o
m
e
va
ri
a
bl
e
T
ot
al
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
cu
rr
en
t
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
(e
p
er
ca
p
it
a
)
T
O
T
A
L
E
X
P
6
8
2
2
6
5
2
8
2
5
,6
7
9
–
A
d
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
A
D
M
I
N
E
X
P
2
7
6
1
1
5
1
0
1
1
,2
2
5
–
W
as
te
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
W
A
S
T
E
E
X
P
1
2
4
6
4
0
5
9
5
–
S
o
ci
al
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
S
O
C
I
A
L
E
X
P
7
0
3
8
1
2
3
6
5
–
R
es
id
u
al
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
R
E
S
I
D
U
A
L
E
X
P
2
1
2
1
6
4
0
5
,1
0
7
T
re
a
tm
en
t
va
ri
a
bl
es
L
o
ca
l
p
ro
p
er
ty
ta
x
(I
C
I)
d
o
es
n
ot
ap
p
ly
o
n
th
e
m
a
in
re
si
d
en
ce
(y
ea
rs
20
08
–2
01
1)
T
A
X
R
E
F
0
.4
4
0
.5
0
0
1
T
h
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
y
b
el
on
gs
to
th
e
gr
ou
p
of
lo
ca
l
g
ov
er
n
m
en
t
n
o
t
ca
p
tu
re
d
b
y
th
e
M
afi
a
N
M
0
.7
9
0
.4
1
0
1
IC
I
d
o
es
n
ot
ap
p
ly
on
th
e
m
ai
n
re
si
d
en
ce
a
n
d
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
b
el
on
gs
to
th
e
gr
ou
p
n
o
t
ca
p
tu
re
d
b
y
th
e
M
a
fi
a
T
A
X
R
E
F
×
N
M
0
.3
5
0
.4
8
0
1
In
d
ic
at
or
of
in
st
it
u
ti
on
al
q
u
al
it
y
fo
r
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
it
ie
s
n
o
t
ca
p
tu
re
d
b
y
th
e
M
afi
a,
b
as
ed
on
th
e
av
er
ag
e
k
il
o
m
et
ri
c
d
is
t-
an
ce
of
ea
ch
m
u
n
ci
p
al
it
iy
fr
om
th
e
ca
p
tu
re
d
o
n
es
N
M
D
0
.3
7
0
.2
9
0
1
IC
I
d
o
es
n
ot
ap
p
ly
on
th
e
m
ai
n
re
si
d
en
ce
a
n
d
th
e
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ty
b
el
on
gs
to
th
e
gr
ou
p
n
o
t
ca
p
tu
re
d
b
y
th
e
M
a
fi
a
,
ta
k
in
g
a
ls
o
in
to
ac
co
u
n
t
th
e
av
er
ag
e
k
il
om
et
ri
c
d
is
ta
n
ce
fr
om
th
e
ca
p
tu
re
d
o
n
es
T
A
X
R
E
F
×
N
M
D
0
.1
6
0
.2
7
0
1
C
o
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
bl
es
P
op
u
la
ti
on
si
ze
P
O
P
1
2
,1
7
0
1
6
,8
2
6
3
4
8
1
1
7
,9
6
3
N
u
m
b
er
of
ol
d
p
eo
p
le
(a
ge
>
75
)
O
L
D
7
2
0
8
6
6
4
4
6
,0
1
1
N
u
m
b
er
of
yo
u
n
g
p
eo
p
le
(a
ge
<
15
)
B
O
Y
2
,3
2
7
3
,4
7
1
3
3
2
6
,5
7
5
M
u
n
ic
ip
al
in
co
m
e
p
er
ca
p
it
a
I
N
C
O
M
E
1
6
,9
6
0
2
,9
4
8
7
,6
6
8
2
5
,9
0
6
In
h
ab
it
an
ts
p
er
sq
u
ar
ed
k
m
of
m
u
n
ic
ip
al
a
re
a
D
E
N
S
1
,1
8
9
1
,9
9
9
1
1
1
2
,9
4
1
D
ea
d
li
n
e
of
th
e
m
an
d
at
e
(y
ea
rs
b
ef
or
e
n
ew
el
ec
ti
o
n
s)
Y
G
O
V
2
.1
4
1
.4
3
0
4
M
ay
or
at
th
e
se
co
n
d
m
an
d
at
e
(t
er
m
li
m
it
)
G
O
V
2
0
.0
7
0
.2
5
0
1
G
ov
er
n
in
g
co
al
it
io
n
p
ar
ti
es
b
el
on
gi
n
g
to
a
ci
v
ic
li
st
C
I
V
I
C
0
.7
0
0
.4
6
0
1
G
ov
er
n
m
en
t
co
n
tr
ol
le
d
b
y
an
ex
te
rn
al
co
m
m
is
si
o
n
C
O
M
M
0
.0
2
0
.1
4
0
1
A
li
gn
m
en
t
w
it
h
p
ro
v
in
ci
al
go
v
er
n
m
en
t
A
L
I
G
P
R
O
V
0
.1
9
0
.3
9
0
1
A
li
gn
m
en
t
w
it
h
re
gi
on
al
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
A
L
I
G
R
E
G
0
.1
6
0
.3
7
0
1
A
li
gn
m
en
t
w
it
h
n
at
io
n
al
go
ve
rn
m
en
t
A
L
I
G
I
T
A
0
.1
4
0
.3
4
0
1
M
ay
or
is
a
fe
m
al
e
M
A
Y
O
R
S
E
X
0
.0
3
0
.1
6
0
1
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
va
lu
es
re
fe
r
to
a
b
al
an
ce
d
p
an
el
o
f
2
0
3
m
u
n
ic
ip
a
li
ti
es
o
b
se
rv
ed
fr
o
m
2
0
0
3
to
2
0
1
1
,
fo
r
a
to
ta
l
o
f
1
,8
2
7
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s.
25
Table 4B: Impact of tax reform on municipal current expenditure per capita –
balanced panel
VARIABLES TOTAL ADMIN WASTE SOCIAL RESIDUAL
TAXREF × NM 53.688*** 4.975 -6.894 5.789** 50.551***
(15.055) (4.952) (4.825) (2.345) (12.967)
POP 1000 -65.984*** -20.477*** -4.620 -8.382** -32.815***
(13.087) (7.589) (4.975) (3.309) (6.659)
POP2 1000 0.352*** 0.089** 0.028 0.047*** 0.191***
(0.069) (0.035) (0.025) (0.015) (0.033)
OLD -0.038** -0.030*** 0.013* -0.005 -0.019
(0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.014)
BOY 0.017** 0.012*** 0.004 0.001 -0.000
(0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
INCOME -0.003 -0.007*** -0.000 0.001 0.002
(0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005)
DENS 0.044 0.016 -0.034 0.019 0.043
(0.055) (0.028) (0.023) (0.015) (0.028)
YGOV -0.650 0.613 0.403 -0.623** -0.722
(2.588) (0.592) (0.460) (0.288) (2.480)
GOV2 -9.091 -4.266 2.533 2.420 -10.357
(15.991) (7.077) (4.452) (5.458) (9.245)
CIVIC -35.174** -10.805* 11.917* -2.056 -34.562***
(14.338) (6.062) (6.228) (2.409) (10.388)
COMM -12.423 -4.453 13.383*** -2.829 -19.753*
(14.065) (6.366) (4.463) (2.313) (11.224)
ALIG PROV 3.488 -2.804 -6.754 5.206 8.229
(8.446) (4.851) (5.360) (3.197) (6.333)
ALIG REG 14.353 2.859 5.882 -2.160 7.476
(8.926) (5.378) (5.951) (3.042) (5.691)
ALIG ITA -22.468*** -3.542 -0.065 -2.483* -16.476**
(8.159) (2.885) (2.244) (1.410) (6.410)
MAYORSEX -6.208 -20.715* -1.047 -0.007 14.531
(21.014) (11.982) (5.500) (2.912) (18.927)
F 18.370 5.516 22.730 4.879 8.395
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nr. observ. 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,827
Nr. municip. 203 203 203 203 203
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All estimates include municipality fixed effects and year fixed effects.
Robust standard errors are reported in round brackets.
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Figure 1B: Average municipal expenditure per capita (TOTAL EXP ) by year and
institutional quality – balanced panel
Table 5B: Sensitivity analysis: continuous indicator of institutional quality –
balanced panel
VARIABLES TOTAL ADMIN WASTE SOCIAL RESIDUAL
TAXREF × NMD 132.810*** 30.161*** -21.293*** 8.422* 117.581***
(38.377) (9.896) (7.807) (4.823) (36.155)
F 19.500 5.653 23.080 4.935 8.358
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nr. observ. 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,827
Nr. municip. 203 203 203 203 203
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All estimates include municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and the
vector X of control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipa-
lity level are reported in round brackets. NMD is a continuous indicator of insti-
tutional quality that is equal to 0 for municipalities captured by the Mafia and as-
sumes a value in the range (0, 1] for municipalities not captured, according to the
average kilometric distance of each municipality from the captured ones.
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Table 6B: Sensitivity analysis: event study framework – balanced panel
VARIABLES TOTAL ADMIN WASTE SOCIAL RESIDUAL
Year04 × NM -0.652 0.386 -1.239 -1.735 2.482
(12.880) (6.032) (3.101) (2.397) (7.654)
Year05 × NM 0.823 -9.560 -1.931 1.126 12.760
(16.646) (8.396) (4.321) (3.088) (10.797)
Year06 × NM 6.708 -3.200 -3.626 2.553 12.389
(18.932) (7.776) (5.433) (3.698) (14.388)
Year07 × NM 30.202 4.245 -3.753 4.208 25.645*
(18.577) (7.144) (6.138) (3.350) (13.930)
Year08 × NM 110.060*** 8.083 -23.181*** 11.399** 118.211***
(39.285) (8.412) (7.113) (4.604) (36.253)
Year09 × NM 28.987 -2.418 -7.189 4.440 34.329**
(20.691) (8.740) (7.590) (4.185) (15.840)
Year10 × NM 50.522** 3.308 -0.643 4.157 44.008**
(21.206) (7.618) (7.926) (4.305) (17.176)
Year11 × NM 48.859** 4.553 -1.289 8.017* 37.778**
(22.183) (9.226) (8.368) (4.549) (16.556)
F 15.520 4.901 21.590 5.088 6.954
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Nr. observ. 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,827 1,827
Nr. municip. 203 203 203 203 203
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: All estimates include municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects and
the vector X of control variables. Robust standard errors clustered at the
municipality level are reported in round brackets. Year04 × NM, Year05 × NM,
Year06 × NM, and Year07 × NM are anticipatory effects (leads), while
Year09 × NM, Year10 × NM and Year11 × NM are post-treatment effects (lags);
Year08 × NM refers to the effect of tax reform in the year of its adoption 2008.
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